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Internationalizing the political economy of hydroelectricity: Security, development, and 
sustainability in hydropower states 
1. Introduction  
Immediate and drastic greenhouse gas emission reductions are needed to reduce climate change.  
As the International Renewable Energy Agency and International Energy Agency (2017) argue, 
meeting the goals enshrined in the Paris Agreement—limiting global temperature rise to below 2 
degrees Celsius—demands we reduce the carbon dioxide intensity of the global economy by 85% in 35 
years.   Reaching such targets will necessitate low-carbon transitions across multiple sociotechnical 
domains, especially electricity.  For as Brown and Sovacool (2011) note, electricity is the single largest 
source of aggregate greenhouse gas emissions in most countries; projections suggest it will be the 
fastest growing energy sector in the future; it reaches more people than other energy systems (about 4.3 
billion people have reliable access to it compared to only 2.1 billion people accessing motorized 
transport); and, given that efforts are underway to electrify the transport sector, the global use of 
electricity will only intensify.   Geels et al. (2017) also emphasize that the world must accelerate 
sociotechnical systems of energy and electricity towards ‘deep decarbonisation.’  Sustainable energy is 
therefore becoming a policy priority for many countries and global governance bodies, and at the heart 
lies choices over which low-carbon forms of electricity supply to support (Newell 2018).   
Clearly, one big decision for many countries (and investors and institutions) is whether to 
encourage large hydroelectric dams.   Hydropower remains, by a wide margin, the largest source of 
renewable electricity around the world, both in terms of installed capacity and global investment flows. 
According to the International Energy Agency (2016), hydropower provided about 16.3 percent of the 
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world’s electricity and about 85 percent of its renewable power in 2015. Hydroelectric dams generated 
at least some grid-connected hydroelectricity in more than 150 countries: at least 50 percent of total 
electricity in more than 60 countries and greater than 90 percent in more than 20 countries (Hancock 
and Sovacool 2018). Haas (2008: 86) argues that dams are the types of infrastructure that ‘most 
fundamentally affect human settlement patterns, livelihoods, health, and the environment,’ given that 
they impound about 14 percent of all global water runoff and operate on 60 percent of the world’s 227 
largest rivers. 
Advocates of hydropower frequently credit it with having advantages over other forms of 
electricity, including very exceptional durability and reliability throughout their long periods of 
operation, higher efficiencies, small costs for operation and maintenance, and vast ‘storage’ of energy 
in reservoirs (International Hydroelectric Association 2003; Kammen 2004; Cernea 2004). 
Hydropower has considerable potential for places like the developing parts of Africa, Asia, and South 
America, where demand for energy is expected to grow significantly (International Energy Agency 
2014; Schneider 2013). In addition, hydroelectric dams can do more than generate electricity; they can 
regulate water flows, provide fresh water, mitigate the effects of floods, and irrigate crops (Lejeune and 
Hui 2012). The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) praised hydropower as a ‘proven, 
mature, predictable and typically price-competitive technology’ and noted that ‘hydropower has acted 
as a catalyst for economic and social development by providing both energy and water management 
services, and it can continue to do so in the future’ (Kumar et al. 2011: 441). Even though the 
International Energy Agency (2012: 7) laments that ‘hydropower is too often overlooked in energy 
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policies’, it projected that ‘annual hydropower capacities and generation should by 2050 roughly 
double from current levels.’ 
However, a body of research has come to oppose large hydroelectric dams for a combination of 
political, economic, environmental, and social reasons (World Commission on Dams 2000). Scudder 
(quoted in Leslie 2014: 5) writes that ‘large dams not only aren’t worth their cost, [but] many currently 
under construction will have disastrous environmental and socio-economic consequences.’ McCully 
(2001) opines that the corporate, financial, and development partners behind hydropower alliances 
form an ‘iron triangle’ that continually transfers revenues from developing countries to developed ones. 
Eissa (2008) and Zeitoun and Warner (2006) warn of ‘hydro-hegemony’ and unjust domination 
occurring as international conglomerates seek to impose their development and energy agendas on poor 
and fragile nations, or when a dominant nation uses hydropower to exert its influence over neighboring 
states.  Hancock and Sovacool (2018) mention the possibility that hydropower countries are prone to a 
‘resource curse.’  At their worst, major hydropower projects can become a ‘hydrological weapon of 
mass destruction’ (Wolf 2007: 243), with pollution and heavy withdrawals of water causing disease, 
the collapse of ecosystems, and societal strife (Lundquvist 1998). 
Which is it: benefit or curse? In this study, we examine how major hydropower states—those 
that generate at least 70% of their national electricity from all types or classes of hydropower dams—
perform from 1985 to 2014 on selected indicators cutting across national security, poverty, economic 
development, debt, corruption, and the environment. We compare the performance of major 
hydropower states with two other mutually exclusive reference classes of countries: members of OPEC 
and all other countries. This is precisely so our analysis moves away from “dam-centric” or single case 
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study approaches to more comprehensive analysis at the national scale.  In doing so, we analyze the 
effect of countries’ hydropower supply rates (generation of electricity) on security, political 
governance, economic development, and climate change.  
In proceeding to examine the political economy of hydropower in this manner, we aim to make 
three contributions. First, for an IPE audience, our exploration of the often-contested role of 
hydropower helps give meaning to broader debates over equity and sustainable development, 
governance, resource extraction, security, technology, centralization, climate change and the 
environment, policy and scale—political and policy discussions surrounding the provision of reliable, 
affordable, safe, and environmentally benign energy services. At one level, these discussion revolve 
around the complex drivers behind energy investments in rising geopolitical powers such as Brazil, 
China, India and South Africa (Schmitz 2017; Baker et al. 2017; Power et al. 2016) as well as changing 
regimes of energy finance (Di Muzio and Ovadia 2016).   At another level, the debate is symbolic of 
future global struggles to simultaneously expand access to energy services while minimizing 
environmental degradation and ensuring sustainable development (Rafey and Sovacool 2011; Kuzemko 
et al. 2016; Newell 2018). Bakker (1999), for one, calls hydropower one of the most visible aspects of a 
global shift in the geopolitics of resource exploitation. However, our results also bring into focus some 
of the pernicious tradeoffs that can occur as one seeks to transition to large-scale sources of energy 
supply: bringing in jobs and generating economic activity, but also inviting corruption; seeking to 
supplant fossil-fuels (and lower carbon emissions), but only by increasing levels of debt, or creating 
new energy security threats.  Finally, our analysis bears resemblance to the ‘resource curse’ debate 
ongoing in IPE (and other fields) (Auty 1993; Karl 1997; Humphreys et al. 2007), and our research 
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design intentionally compares major hydropower states with others (such as those belonging to OPEC) 
to better understand whether hydroelectric countries are similarly ‘cursed.’  Despite these links, 
Hancock and Sovacool (2018) argue that so far hydropower remains understudied in IPE scholarship.  
Keating (2018: 199) also writes that hydropower “necessitates an IPE analysis” because it involves 
multiple political actors with competing norms operating across multiple scalar levels.  
Second, for the energy studies, development studies, and hydropower studies communities, we 
seek to move beyond research dominated by single country/project case studies (e.g. Three Gorges 
Dam, or Nepal), utilizing single methods (e.g., performing an Environmental Impact Assessment or 
modeling future capacity), or assessing only a single dimension to hydropower (e.g. its financial risk, 
or jobs created).  Mixed methods and comparative research is incredibly rare within the academic 
communities exploring these topics (Sovacool and Walter 2018).  Instead, our approach is comparative 
(involving multiple classes of countries), mixed-methods (two different statistical analyses separately 
conducted in three timeframes), and multidimensional (covering economic, political, and even military 
and environmental aspects).   
Third, we seek to inform practice and implementation of policy. Today’s investments in 
technologies like hydroelectric dams will lock in energy trajectories for decades to come. Plans to build 
large dams continue, on the grounds of promoting security of supply and electrification— especially 
for the benefit of the 1.3 billion people residing in rural areas of the world (mostly in Africa and Asia) 
who do not have access to modern energy services (International Energy Agency 2014). Of the $11.1 
trillion the world was anticipated to spend on energy infrastructure from 2005 to 2030, $1.9 trillion was 
expected to go exclusively to hydropower (Haas 2008). For these reasons, the hydropower industry sits 
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at a critical juncture where much of its global capacity has yet to be built (Sternberg 2010: 713). 
Properly understanding the broader impacts of the technology, and of the assumptions underpinning the 
industry’s expansion, is essential to properly weighing its costs, benefits, and future role.  
2. Literature Review: Generating Hydropower Hypotheses  
 We began our study with an extensive review of the academic literature, generating from 
separate sets a list of six hydropower hypotheses (see Table 1) for our empirical analysis. We 
hypothesize that major hydropower states would exhibit comparatively more conflict, experience more 
poverty and corruption, have lower economic growth rates, greater rates of public debt, and emit more 
emissions of CO2 than non-major hydropower states. The (sometimes vast) academic literature 
supporting each of these hypotheses is explored in detail in this section of the paper.  
Table 1: Hydropower Dimensions, Hypotheses, and Affiliated Disciplines  
Dimension Hypothesis  Disciplines 
Security Hydropower increases conflict.  Security studies, geopolitics, water resources management, 
transboundary governance, political geography 
Poverty Hydropower increases poverty.  Social development, human security, development studies, 
poverty studies  
Development Hydropower decreases 
economic growth rates.  
Development economics, energy studies, health studies, 
environmental science  
Fiscal responsibility  Hydropower increases rates of 
public debt.  
Project management, public policy and administration, 
transaction cost economics 
Corruption  Hydropower increases 
corruption.  
Governance, public policy, political science  
Environmental 
degradation  
Hydropower increases 
greenhouse gas emissions.  
Environmental science, project management, energy studies, 
climate policy, physical geography  
Source: Compiled by the authors  
2.1 Hydropower and conflict 
This hypothesis suggests that, similar to “petrostates” rich in resources such as oil (Colgan 
2010; Colgan 2014), hydropower states will have more internal and external conflict, stemming largely 
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from the water wars and water management literature (see Gleick 1993; Swain 2001 and Wolf 2007 for 
insightful overviews) as well as literature arguing that energy is becoming increasingly linked with 
other areas, notably water (Kuzemko et al 2018). In 1995, for example, World Bank vice president 
Ismail Serageldin suggested that ‘the wars of the next century will be about water’ (quoted in Wolf et 
al. 2005: 81). Hydropower, the thinking goes, is one critical factor that can contribute to this conflict. 
As Hensel et al. (2006: 391) write, ‘(t)he presence of hydroelectric projects on the river will increase 
the value of the water supply to one or both sides. Previous research has demonstrated a strong 
relationship between issue salience and the occurrence of militarized conflict over territorial issues, as 
well as decreased effectiveness of peaceful conflict management efforts.’  
This literature suggests at least five possible ways that hydropower may be a catalyst for 
internal or external conflict (Gleick et al. 2014; Wolf 2007; White 2002). First, hydroelectric dams may 
serve as a military tool (for example, when state actors use them to interrupt or suspend water supplies 
during an international dispute). Second, they may be targeted by state actors during military 
campaigns. Third, non-state terrorists may attack dams to promote their agendas. Fourth, dams may be 
used to achieve a political goal, such as poverty reduction or provision of jobs. Fifth, water resources or 
dams may become a source of contention in disputes about economic and social development. Any or 
all may make hydropower projects sites contestation and conflict, giving rise to what Wolff (2007) 
calls ‘hydropolitical vulnerability.’ As Wolf (2007: 244) explains: 
There is no such thing as managing water for a single purpose—all water management is multi-
objective and is therefore, by definition, based on conflicting interests. Within a nation, these 
interests include domestic use, agriculture, hydropower generation, recreation, and 
environment—any two of which are regularly at odds—and the chances of finding mutually 
acceptable solutions drop precipitously as more actors are involved. 
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Though this hypothesis may strike some as far-fetched, there is anecdotal evidence behind it, 
summarized by Table 2. 
Table 2: Historical Examples of Hydropower and Intra-/International Conflict 
Year Type Country Description  
1970 Political tool South Africa  Troops move into Angola to occupy and defend the Ruacana hydropower 
complex, including the Gove Dam on the Kunene River. The goal is to take 
possession of and defend the water resources in southwestern Africa and 
Namibia. 
1981 Military target Iran Iranian government leaders claim to have bombed a hydroelectric facility in 
Kurdistan during the Iran–Iraq War, blacking out large portions of Iraq.  
1982 Development 
dispute  
Guatemala  In Río Negro, 177 civilians are killed over opposition to the Chixoy 
hydroelectric dam. 
1992 Military target Moldova  Hostilities between Moldova and Russia in a short but intense conflict include a 
rocket-artillery attack on the hydroelectric turbines at the Dubossary power 
station on the Nistru (or Dniester) River. 
1993 Military target Yugoslavia  Serbian/Yugoslav army forces detonate explosives at the Peruća Dam on the 
Cetina River in an attempt to wipe out Croatian villages and the port city of 
Omiš. A successful Croatian counterattack allows military engineers to reach the 
dam and release water in time to prevent it from bursting, saving an estimated 
twenty to thirty thousand civilians. 
1998 Military target Sri Lanka A civil war and related military campaigns leave infrastructure in the North, 
including hydroelectric dams, demolished  
2000 Terrorism  Philippines  Hydroelectric dams in Mindanao become ‘a source of popular local resistance because they impinge on ancestral lands and are potential targets of sabotage’ by rebel groups seeking independence.  
2001 Military target Afghanistan U.S. military forces bomb the hydroelectric facility at Kajaki Dam in Helmand 
Province, cutting off electricity for the city of Kandahar. 
2002 Military 
target/terrorism  
Nepal  The Khumbuwan Liberation Front (KLF) blows up a 250-kilowatt hydroelectric 
powerhouse in Nepals Bhojpur District, cutting off power to Bhojpur and 
surrounding areas. Later that year Maoist rebels destroy seven micro-hydro 
projects, a water supply intake, and supply pipelines to Khalanga, in western 
Nepal 
2002 Development 
dispute 
Botswana and 
Namibia  
Botswana’s claims for water to sustain the Okavango Delta and its lucrative 
ecotourism industry have contributed to a political dispute with upstream 
Namibia, which wants to use the water passing through the Caprivi Strip on its 
way to the delta for irrigation. 
2005 Terrorism  Ukraine. The Kiev Hydropower Station on the Dnieper River receives a threat that forty 
rail cars filled with explosives have been placed on a portion of levees holding 
back the reservoir. 
2012 Political tool Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan  
Uzbekistan cuts natural gas deliveries to Tajikistan in retaliation over a Tajik 
hydroelectric dam that Uzbeks say will disrupt water supplies. 
2012 Military tool  Syria After days of heavy clashes, Syrian rebels fighting the government of President 
Bashar al-Assad overrun governmental forces and capture the Tishrin 
hydroelectric dam on the Euphrates River.  
2014 Military 
target/terrorism 
Iraq Members of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) undertake a four-day 
coordinated attack against the Mosul Dam, where they were resisted 
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successfully by Iraqi military forces with assistance from Kurdish fighters and 
United States airstrikes   
Source: Authors’ compilation from Gleick and Heberger 2014; Sovacool 2013; Wolf 2007; Schiavo-Campo and Judd 2005; 
and Turton et al. 2003. 
2.2 Hydropower and poverty 
The hypothesis that hydropower projects can contribute to poverty is supported by a variety of 
disciplines advancing a broad, but interconnected, set of arguments. Granted, most of this research does 
not discuss increases or decreases in poverty at a state level, but are more confined, local/provincial 
levels or (most commonly) the scale of an individual dam.  Still, we hypothesize that if such findings 
hold true at smaller scales, in aggregate the effect of hydropower on national level poverty could be 
significant.    
For instance, studies have suggested that in rural areas hydropower projects may exacerbate 
poverty by interfering with food security, especially the vitality of fisheries or availability of 
agricultural land (Sarkkula et al. 2009; Pearse-Smith 2012; Wolf et al. 2005; Tilt et al. 2009). In many 
developing countries, hydroelectric dams can interfere with inland transport. Lack of railroads, limited 
road networks, and great distances between villages make rivers key to a community’s livelihood (Ping 
et al. 2008). Another supporting argument is that hydropower projects can contribute to capture of 
resources by the elite, exacerbating concentration of wealth and/or marginalizing of ethnic minorities 
and indigenous groups (Rothfelder 2003; Smith 2003). As Wolf et al. (2005: 83) write: 
Because dams are generally situated near the ancient homes of indigenous nations, it is 
ultimately rural and ethnic minorities far from the central corridors of power who are 
typically forced to pay the price. Ill-considered development plans … generate 
conditions and conflicts that threaten the security of individual and group rights to 
culture, self-determination, livelihood, and life itself. 
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In Mali, for instance, dams built on the Bafing River increased land values along the river corridors 
where high-intensity agriculture would become possible, prompting the elite in Mauritania to rewrite 
land ownership regulations, ‘effectively abrogating the rights of black Africans to continue farming, 
herding, and fishing along the Mauritanian riverbank’ (Homer-Dixon 1994: 35). In China, 
hydroelectric dams in Yunnan Province were promoted as mechanisms of poverty alleviation and local 
employment but, in practice, have benefitted primarily urban centers and industrial clusters hundreds of 
kilometers away (Magee 2006). In Myanmar and Thailand, hydroelectricity has enabled government 
elites to capture public resources for their own profit (Matthews 2012; Simpson 2007; Greacen and 
Greacen 2004).  
A similar strand of this argument is that resettlement and forced relocation enabling 
hydropower projects often cause excessive, irreversible damage. The World Commission on Dams 
(2000) estimated that about four million people are displaced annually by activities relating to 
hydroelectricity construction or operation, and forty to eighty million have been displaced in the past 
fifty years. As Imhof and Lanza (2010: 2) surmise, ‘big dams can contribute to development, but that 
progress often comes at staggering cost, in displaced and impoverished refugees, ecologically 
fragmented and damaged rivers, and downstream victims of destroyed fisheries and impounded 
sediments.’ Terminski (2013: 16) even went so far as to conclude that ‘dam building is the greatest 
cause of development-induced displacement worldwide.’ According to one study of World Bank–
financed hydroelectric projects, 26.6 percent required involuntary resettlement of communities (Rew et 
al. 2000: 91).  
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Resettlement often poses severe hardship for communities. In the past, for example, 
governments in Lesotho, India, and Sri Lanka reneged on agreed-upon resettlement policies, refused to 
provide replacement land, or ignored treaty obligations (Scudder 2008). As Bosshard and Golzimer 
(2005: 4) put it, ‘resettlement and compensation plans have had a nearly universal record of failure, 
almost always failing to restore, much less improve, the livelihoods of affected populations’. Similarly, 
the World Commission on Dams (2000: 4) observe that the ‘lack of equity in the distribution of 
benefits has called into question the value of many dams in meeting water and energy development 
needs when compared with the alternatives’. Resettlement directly contributes to poverty, the impact of 
displacement can include loss of land, joblessness, homelessness, marginalization, food insecurity, 
increased health risks, social disarticulation, and the loss of civil and human rights (Cernea 1997; 
Downing 2002; Brown et al. 2008). Compensation rarely occurs, and when it does, it typically is 
insufficient to restore, let alone, improve quality of life for the displaced (Brown and Xu 2010). In 
China, for instance, Zhao et al. (2012) estimated that the net incomes of rural households displaced by 
dam building equaled only 53 percent of the national average.  
2.3 Hydropower and economic growth 
Rather than focusing on uneven development within countries (poverty), this hypothesis looks 
at rates of development between them (gross domestic product, or GDP), and it suggests that 
hydropower states could be prone to slower rates of economic growth, something important from the 
perspective of national policy. Salazar (2000: 173) writes that when done poorly, the negative 
economic impacts of dams can ‘likely hinder the economic viability of the country as a whole.’   
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Proponents of this hypothesis suppose that there are several ways that hydropower projects can 
stymie economic development and lead to sluggish economic growth. One is by creating boom towns 
during construction that give the appearance of economic development on national indicators but fade 
away, once the project is completed (Cernea 2004). Another is that the stated goal of some hydropower 
projects is not to build a dam, but to promote foreign policy goals such as democracy promotion or the 
selling of arms (Lankester 2013). And Fox and Sneddon (2007) go so far as to argue that dam 
development is a way to subvert the global south by promoting development goals of industrialized 
nations. Another reason dams can degrade economic growth relates to some of their negative socio-
environmental impacts (Holdren and Smith 2000: 79; Burke et al. 2009; Valença et al. 2007; Adams et 
al. 1986; Lerer and Scudder 1999) that can be monetized into economic losses. One such effect 
concerns accidents at dams and their effects on social, economic, and political stability when they fail. 
One study looking at global energy accidents over one hundred years found that while hydroelectric 
dams were responsible for fewer than 1 percent of total energy accidents by frequency, they claimed 94 
percent of reported fatalities and entailed $9.7 billion in damages (in $2007) (Sovacool 2008). 
There are other ways that dams potentially interfere with economic growth. For instance, many 
of the revenues from hydropower construction or operation flow out of national economies to foreign 
investors. In addition, hydropower projects can create a lag in a nation’s per capita income. In China, 
greater hydropower development has, perhaps ironically, led to social displacement and blackouts for 
consumers as industrial customers use the bulk of the electricity generated (Ma 2011; McNally et al. 
2009). Similarly, in Europe, hydropower facilities have been prone to non-optimal management: 
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reservoirs are depleted, leading to lower overall efficiency and, by extension, to sub-optimal economic 
impact (Lehner et al. 2005).  
2.4 Hydropower and debt 
This hypothesis holds that cost overruns and diseconomies of scale frequently associated with 
hydropower projects are corrosive to fiscal discipline. Flyvbjerg (quoted in Leslie 2014: 2) states, ‘For 
many countries, the national economy is so fragile that the debt from just one mega-dam can 
completely negatively affect the national economy’. Merrow et al. (1988: 2-3) warn that ‘such 
enormous sums of money ride on the success of megaprojects … that company balance sheets and even 
government balance-of-payments accounts can be affected for years by the outcomes’. For example, 
the 44,000 MW Grand Inga Dam being built in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, will cost $80 
billion (Green et al. 2015), more than twice the country’s annual GDP.  
 The historical record seems to confirm this hypothesis. One recent study used reference class 
forecasting to assess the outcomes and costs of 245 dams—186 of them hydroelectric —built between 
1934 and 2007 across five continents and 65 countries and collectively involving more than $353 
billion of investment (Ansar et al. 2014). The study found ‘overwhelming evidence that budgets are 
systematically biased below actual costs of large hydropower dams’ and that ‘actual costs were on 
average 96% higher than estimated costs’. The authors highlighted that these cost-overrun figures are 
exceptionally conservative, as they exclude inflation, substantial debt servicing, and other 
environmental and social factors. A series of follow-up studies of 401 electricity infrastructure projects 
around the world also concluded that cost overruns afflicted 75.4 percent of the hydroelectric projects 
in the sample and that these exhibited a mean cost escalation of 70.6 percent per project (Sovacool et 
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al. 2014a; Sovacool et al. 2014b). As Table 3 indicates, compared to other types of infrastructure, only 
nuclear reactor construction is more susceptible to cost escalation than hydropower projects are.  
Table 3: Mean Cost Escalation for Various Infrastructure Projects 
Technology Mean Cost Overrun Escalation (% project budget) (n) for the sample 
Nuclear reactors 117 180 
Hydroelectric dams 71 61 
Railway networks 45 58 
Bridges and tunnels 34 33 
Roads 20 167 
Mining Projects 14 63 
Thermal Power Plants  13 36 
Wind Farms 8 35 
Transmission Projects 8 50 
Solar Farms 1 39 
Source: Sovacool et al. (2014c).  
 There are several reasons why hydropower projects are so prone to exhibit cost overruns and 
debt. Their construction is technically complex, and involves unique elements, such as the need to build 
coffer dams and excavate large amounts of subsurface rocks, often resulting in unexpected costs during 
construction (World Commission on Dams 2000). Dams are also prone to excessive construction 
delays: in their study of electricity infrastructure, Sovacool et al. (2014a) calculated a mean 
construction time of 118 months for hydroelectric dams. Many countries need to take out loans to 
finance their construction. Leslie (2014: 3) argues that they ‘consume large chunks of developing 
countries’ financial resources, as dam planners underestimate the impact of inflation and currency 
depreciation’, and that ‘many of the funds that support large dams arrive as loans to the host countries, 
and must eventually be paid off in hard currency’.  
2.5 Hydropower and corruption 
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This hypothesis is that hydropower projects facilitate corruption. As Transparency International 
(2008: xxv) explains: 
The hydropower sector’s massive investment volumes and highly complex, customized 
engineering projects can be a breeding ground for corruption in the design, tendering 
and execution of large-scale dam projects around the world. The impact of corruption is 
not confined to inflated project costs, however. Large resettlement funds and 
compensation programs that accompany dam projects have been found to be very 
vulnerable to corruption, adding to the corruption risks in the sector. 
 
The World Commission on Dams (2000: 6) reached a similar conclusion when they wrote that 
‘decision-makers may be inclined to favor large infrastructure as they provide opportunities for 
personal enrichment not afforded by smaller or more diffuse alternatives.’ Butterworth and Harpe 
(2009: 1) conclude that ‘multimillion dollar water infrastructure projects carry some of the largest 
corruption risks in the sector’ and that ‘the potential for grand corruption in big dam projects and 
upgrading urban water and sanitation systems can be so significant as to skew policy making towards 
the most lucrative investments.’  In Figure 1, Haas (2008) illustrates how corruption can occur at every 
stage in the hydropower project cycle.  
Figure 1: Corruption Risks and the Hydropower Project Cycle 
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Source: Haas 2008 
 There are many strong arguments in favor of the corruption hypothesis, even if precise 
assessments are, predictably, difficult to achieve.  Haas (2008) estimates that corruption in the 
hydropower sector accounts for $5–6 billion of lost revenue each year. This, however, may be overly 
conservative. Plummer (2008) offers the ‘best-case scenario’ that corruption siphons off 10 percent of 
the budget of all infrastructure and that, at worst, 30 percent disappears. Given that the World 
Economic Forum reports that global spending on infrastructure amounts to about $2.7 trillion each year 
(Economist 2014), the price tag for corruption ranges from $270 billion to $810 billion. The World 
Bank (2013) offers a ‘conservative estimate’ of $1 trillion in annual worldwide bribery—only one type 
of corruption.  The complexity of dam building can generate a lack of accountability and opaque 
project management (Bossard et al. 2008). For example, there may be separate contracts for equipment, 
civil works, materials, construction, management, as well as for external consultancies involving local, 
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national, and international actors, each with their own requirements. Resettlement activities that 
involve large sums of money can also create opportunities for graft (Scudder 2008; Sohail and Cavill 
2007).    
The historical record of numerous cases supports these concerns. In Lesotho, Indonesia, 
Thailand, and Kenya, dam builders used ‘corrupt practices’ to acquire reservoir sites that were reserved 
for indigenous people or impinged on protected national wildlife refuges (Scudder 2008). Government 
officials reportedly stole $50 million of resettlement funds appropriated for the Three Gorges Dam in 
China, leading to ‘the largest such corruption scandal on record’ (Haas 2008: 98). Costs for the 
Yacyretá Dam between Argentina and Paraguay ballooned by $2.7 billion, due to bribes and 
misappropriation of funds (Sohail and Cavill 2007). In Malaysia, Sarawak Energy has been accused of 
granting $200 million worth of hydropower contracts to companies linked directly to the Chief 
Minister’s family (Bruno Manser Fund 2013). 
2.6 Hydropower and environmental degradation  
To those outside of the hydropower sector, our final hypothesis may seem counterintuitive, but 
the act of building (and maintaining) a dam can be an energy-intensive and greenhouse gas emissions-
intensive process.  Dams can also produce a range of noxious environmental impacts, many of them 
with negative implications on sustainability and climate change.   For instance, land clearing and 
deforestation during dam construction, flooding and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs, changes 
in hydrology and water quality, and the impacts from downstream uses (such as aluminum smelting) 
can all lead to negative climatic or environmental effects. 
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In terms of climate change and greenhouse gas emissions specifically, Gagnon and Vate (1997) 
accounted for emissions (direct and indirect) embodied in the construction of hydroelectric dams as 
well as emissions from decaying biomass from flooded land in reservoirs.  Although they found that in 
“most cases” hydropower’s carbon footprint was better than fossil fuels, this was not always true, 
especially in tropical climates where reservoir emissions could be “very high.”  Fearnside (2004: 8) 
examined emissions profiles dams and noted that, due to the large volume of water (and dissolved 
biomass) that reservoirs contain, they:  
become virtual methane factories, with the rise and fall of the water level in the reservoir 
alternately flooding and submerging large areas of land around the shore; soft green vegetation 
quickly grows on the exposed mud, only to decompose under anaerobic conditions at the 
bottom of the reservoir when the water rises again. This converts atmospheric carbon dioxide 
into methane, with a much higher impact on global warming.  
 
Such methane is released as reservoirs are drawn down in times of drought or greater need for 
electricity, as well as in smaller amounts during ordinary operation as water flows over the turbines and 
spillway.  In Brazil, the 8,370 MW Tucuru Dam in the Amazon produces more greenhouse gases than 
Brazil's largest city, São Paulo; and another dam upriver generates 11.2 million tons of carbon per year, 
equivalent to the annual emissions of 2.3 million cars (Fearnside 2002).  Other studies have confirmed 
these findings, namely that the carbon footprint or lifecycle impact of a dam can vary greatly 
depending on design, location and climate, maintenance, and lifetime of operation (among other 
factors) (World Commission on Dams 2000; Vate 1997; Raadal et al. 2011). 
 These sorts of emissions releases are separate from a variety of other veritable factors that can 
negatively impact the environment (and lead to higher emissions profiles).  In Malaysia, for example, 
construction of the 2,400 MW Bakun Dam necessitated the land clearing and deforestation of 1.5 
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million hectares of land, a size larger than the country of Singapore (Choy 2005a).  It also resulted in 
access roads built to the dam that ‘opened up’ entire tropical forests to logging and poaching (Sovacool 
and Bulan 2011).  As one expert noted, Bakun ‘has massive climate impacts for it essentially took a 
huge sink of carbon dioxide, a primary forest, and converted it to a source of methane and other 
greenhouse gases, emissions so large that they are likely equivalent to all of the emissions from 
Malaysia’s coal-fired power plants’ (Sovacool and Bulan 2011: 4856).   
Table 4 summarizes other negative impacts that hydroelectric dams can have on habitats, water 
quality, and environmental sustainability.  Both Brismar (2004) and Wang et al. (2013) warn that much 
of the time, only lower order impacts at a single dam are evaluated, whereas in reality, lower- and 
higher-order impacts occur and they can cascade across multiple dams—meaning impact assessments 
can underestimate the true extent of environmental damage.  Kibler and Tullos (2013) further suggest 
that the cumulative effects (in terms of habitat destruction) of many small dams can outweigh those of 
one large dam.  Separate still from these direct environmental impacts are the various processes and 
purposes for which hydroelectricity is put to use. If utilized for industrial manufacturing and aluminum 
smelting, for instance, then downstream emissions can be significant, with a single aluminum smelter 
emitting volumes of carbon dioxide, hydrogen fluoride, silicon tetrafluoride, and solid particles similar 
to those of a coal-fired power station (Choy 2005b).  
Table 4: Negative Environmental Impacts from Hydroelectric Dams 
Stage Environmental Impact 
Clearing and Construction Increased water turbidity 
Loss of pool nursery habitat 
Reduced organic input 
Impaired migration of fish 
Embodied emissions in materials (concrete, steel) 
Greenhouse gas emissions from land clearing 
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Impoundment  Reduced river flow, turbidity, and organic input 
Loss of habitat due to reduced water depth 
Reduced reservoir turbidity 
Increased phytoplankton production 
Impaired fish migration 
Replacement of natural riverine habitat with artificial deep 
lake habitat 
Greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs 
Operation Reduced river turbidity 
Reduced river dissolved oxygen content 
Increased hydrogen sulphide 
Impaired fish migration 
Altered upstream species composition  
Replacement of native riverine species with lake-adapted 
species in reservoir 
Need for fossil-fuelled backup power during unplanned 
outages of maintenance 
Decommissioning  Embodied emissions in decommissioning activities  
Changes in land use for remediation   
Source: Authors’ compilation from Holdren and Smith (2000: 79); International Hydroelectric Association (2003: 14); 
Manyari and Carvalho (2007); Sovacool and Bulan (2011); Wang et al. (2012) 
3. Research Design and Analysis  
 This section of the paper briefly describes how we tested our hypotheses, presenting the metrics 
that function as dependent variables and giving an overview of and justification for our research design.  
As we will explain, the core of our assessment is testing three reference classes of countries: ‘major 
hydropower countries’ (which generate 70% or more of their national electricity supply from 
hydroelectric dams), ‘OPEC countries’, and all remaining ‘non-hydro and non-OPEC countries’.   
We decided that countries served as our best unit of analysis, rather than individual dams or 
hydropower projects, or other types of actors such as transnational firms or governance networks.  This 
is because ‘the nation state remains where most energy planning and policymaking takes place, and it is 
also how most major energy statistics are collected, based on national boundaries’ (Brown et al. 2014: 
5).  In addition, notwithstanding ‘new modes of governance’ above and below countries (Florini and 
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Sovacool 2009), a majority of important political decisions are still made at the state level, and the 
state-based international system has demonstrated a high degree of coherence (Falkner 2013).  
Countries also hold significant positive potential in their ability to address major challenges such as 
climate change and energy transitions (Johnstone and Newell 2018).  As such, Eckersley (2004: iv) 
calls states the ‘gatekeepers of the global order,’ and adds that they remain the ‘preeminent political 
institution for addressing environmental problems.’   
3.1 Choosing metrics and dependent variables 
 Our first step was to select country metrics and data to correspond with each of our six 
hypotheses. As Table 5 summarizes, to measure conflicts we relied on the UCDP database from 
Uppsala; for poverty, we chose the ‘poverty gap’, a measure that reflects both the depth and incidence 
of poverty; for economic growth, we selected GDP per capita; and we investigated total debt stocks to 
evaluate debt. For corruption, we depended on the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators 
dataset as this data draws from more sources and offers a greater range of dates than the Corruption 
Perceptions Index from Transparency International (World Bank 2017b). For environmental 
degradation, we selected the metric greenhouse gas emissions per capita.  
Table 5 Hydropower Security and Development Hypotheses and Metrics  
Hypothesis Metric Definition Range Source 
Hydropower increases 
internal conflict.  
number of 
internal conflicts  
A contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use 
of armed force between two parties, of 
which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least twenty-five battle-
related deaths 
1985-2014 UCDP/PRIO 
(2017); Themnér, 
Lotta & Peter 
Wallensteen 
(2014), Conflict 
types 3 and 4 
Hydropower increases 
poverty.  
Poverty gap at 
$1.90 a day 
Mean shortfall from the poverty line 
(counting the non-poor as having zero 
1985-2014 World Bank 
(2017a) 
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(PPP) (%) 
 
shortfall), expressed as a percentage of the 
poverty line 
Hydropower 
decreases economic 
growth rates.  
GDP per capita 
($) 
Gross domestic product divided by 
midyear population. GDP is the sum of 
gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy, plus any product taxes and 
minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated 
without making deductions for 
depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural 
resources. Data are in constant 2010 U.S. 
dollars. 
1985-2014 World Bank 
(2017a) 
Hydropower increases 
rates of public debt.  
External debt 
stocks (% of 
GNI) 
Total external debt is debt owed to 
nonresidents repayable in currency, goods, 
or services. Total external debt is the sum 
of public, publicly guaranteed, and private 
nonguaranteed long-term debt, use of IMF 
credit, and short-term debt. Short-term 
debt includes all debt having an original 
maturity of one year or less and interest in 
arrears on long-term debt. GNI (formerly 
GNP) is the sum of value added by all 
resident producers, plus any product taxes 
(less subsidies) not included in the 
valuation of output, plus net receipts of 
primary income (compensation of 
employees and property income) from 
abroad. 
1985-2014 World Bank 
(2017a) 
Hydropower increases 
corruption.  
Control of 
corruption  
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of 
corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state 
by elites and private interests. 
1996-2014 World Bank 
(2017b). 
Hydropower increases 
greenhouse gas 
emissions 
Total greenhouse 
gas emissions (in 
tons of CO2 
equivalents per 
capita) 
This metric is composed of CO2 totals 
excluding short-cycle biomass burning 
(such as agricultural waste burning and 
Savannah burning) but including other 
biomass burning (such as forest fires, post-
burn decay, peat fires and decay of drained 
peatlands), all anthropogenic CH4 sources, 
N2O sources and F-gases (HFCs, PFCs 
and SF6), divided by the average total 
population per country.  
1985-2012 World Bank 
(2017a) 
Source: Compiled by the authors.  
 
3.2 Research design and country reference groups  
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An empirical analysis of the effect of hydropower on security, economic, development and 
environmental indicators confronts three major challenges.  First, the effects of hydropower dams 
independent from generation – such as construction, design, excavation, building, and financing – are 
distinct from the those of hydropower electricity production, which deals with operating and 
maintaining an electric power plant. Second, the long timeframe, missing data and presumed high 
variability of the exact onset of hydropower effects make analysis challenging. And third, various other 
variables that influence economic and development indicators in a country (e.g., a government’s 
commitment to democratic values), could cloud the relationship between hydropower and performance 
on our indicators.  
The design of our research was specifically chosen to account for these three challenges. We 
relied heavily on both method and data triangulation techniques  to increase the reliability and validity 
of our research findings (for an overview, see Hussy et al. 2010). Regarding data triangulation, we 
chose three long timeframes over 30 years (timeframe 1: 1985-1994; timeframe 2: 1995-2004; 
timeframe 3: 2005-2014) and calculated the average score per dependent variable and country for each 
of these two timeframes. Thus, we were able to counter the challenge of missing data points (of which 
there were many) and to conduct our analysis of the three periods separately. 
Regarding method triangulation, we conducted two separate analyses to test our six hypotheses 
per timeframe. First, we conducted a comparative country analysis to analyze the differences in the 
selected six dependent variables between (1) countries high in hydropower production (electricity 
supply), (2) non-hydro countries (countries which are not part of group 1 and group 3), and (3) 
members of OPEC.  Country classes were mutually exclusive, and whenever a country may have fit 
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into two classes (e.g., Gabon and Venezuela), it was placed in the hydropower reference class. We 
selected OPEC countries, rich in oil and gas, in addition to non-hydropower countries to see whether 
hydropower states outperformed those traditionally associated with the ‘resource curse’ (Robinson et 
al. 2006; Hammond 2011).  Van de Graaf and Bradshaw (2018) also note how oil exporting countries, 
many of which belong to OPEC, face some collective and daunting challenges on the horizon as a new 
world order emerges where oil is replaced by natural gas and threatened by peaks in demand. 
Table 6 gives an overview of countries and inclusion criteria for each of the three country 
classes in the three timeframes. For hydropower state classification, one dataset of the World Bank was 
used (World Bank 2017a): electricity production per country and year from hydroelectric sources as a 
percentage of energy from all sources. In the first timeframe, our data analysis encompassed 113 
countries, followed by 137 countries in timeframe 2 and 140 countries in timeframe 3, with lower case 
numbers due to missing data, mostly related to islands or microstates.   To put these numbers in 
perspective, the United Nations currently has 193 member states.  Nonetheless, the countries included 
in our analysis still account for 91.6% of the world population in timeframe 1, 96.2% of the world 
population in timeframe 2 and 96.0% of the world population in timeframe 3, respectively. We used the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test to analyze the differences between the three country classes, 
since some groups were quite small, and this test yields more robust results than the parametric t-test. 
For hypothesis testing, we focused on significant differences between hydropower countries and non-
hydropower countries. Findings derived from the comparison of hydropower countries with OPEC 
countries were treated as additional, more anecdotal evidence.  
Table 6: Definition of three country reference groups 
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Country reference 
group 
Timeframe 1 
1985-1994 
Timeframe 2 
1995-2004 
Timeframe 3 
2005-2014 
Hydropower 
countries: 
Countries with a  
hydropower 
electricity 
production rate  
> 70% in previous 
year to timeframe 
25 total 
Angola, Albania, Brazil, 
Chile, Cameroon, Congo 
(Dem. Rep.), Congo 
(Rep.), Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, Ghana, 
Honduras, Iceland, 
Kenya, Sri Lanka, 
Norway, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Peru, Paraguay, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe 
33 total 
Angola, Albania, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Congo (Dem. Rep.), 
Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, 
Honduras, Iceland, Kenya, Sri 
Lanka, Norway, Nepal, New 
Zealand, Peru, Paraguay, 
Tanzania, Uruguay, Zambia, 
Venezuela, Colombia, Haiti, 
Mozambique, Panama, 
Vietnam, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Latvia, Namibia, Tajikistan 
23 total 
Angola, Albania, Brazil, 
Cameroon, Congo (Dem. Rep.), 
Congo (Rep.), Costa Rica, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Iceland, 
Norway, Nepal, Peru, Paraguay, 
Uruguay, Zambia, Venezuela, 
Colombia,  
Mozambique, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Namibia, Tajikistan, Georgia 
OPEC countries:  
Countries which 
are members of 
OPEC for the 
whole timeframe 
and which are not 
hydropower 
countries  
11 total 
United Arab Emirates, 
Algeria, Indonesia 
Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, Venezuela 
10 total 
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
Indonesia, Iran,  
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
9 total 
United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
Iran,  
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, 
Qatar, Saudi Arabia 
Non-hydropower 
countries:  
All countries 
which do not fit 
the criteria of 
hydropower and 
OPEC countries  
77 total 
Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Benin, 
Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Botswana, 
Canada, Switzerland, 
China, Cote d'Ivoire, 
Colombia, Cuba, 
Curacao, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Spain, 
Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Guatemala, 
Hong Kong, Haiti, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Jamaica, 
Jordan, Japan, Korea, 
Lebanon,  
Luxembourg, Morocco, 
Mexico, Malta, 
Myanmar, Mozambique, 
Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Netherlands, 
94 total 
Chile, Gabon, Zimbabwe, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Benin, Bangladesh, 
Bulgaria, Bahrain, Bolivia, 
Brunei Darussalam, Botswana, 
Canada, Switzerland, China, 
Cote d'Ivoire, Cuba, Curacao, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, 
Germany, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, Spain, 
Finland, France, United 
Kingdom, Gibraltar, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, 
Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Morocco, Mexico, Malta, 
Myanmar, Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Netherlands, Oman, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, 
North Korea, Portugal, 
Romania, Sudan, Senegal, 
Singapore, El Salvador, Slovak 
Republic, Sweden, Syria, Togo, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
108 total 
Ecuador, Honduras, Kenya, Sri 
Lanka, New Zealand, Tanzania, 
Haiti, Panama, Vietnam, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Latvia, 
Indonesia, Chile, Gabon, 
Zimbabwe, Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, 
Benin, Bangladesh, Bulgaria, 
Bahrain, Bolivia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Botswana, Canada, 
Switzerland, China, Cote 
d'Ivoire, Cuba, Curacao, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Germany, 
Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Egypt, Spain, Finland, France, 
United Kingdom, Gibraltar, 
Greece, Guatemala, Hong Kong, 
Hungary, India, Ireland, Israel, 
Italy, Jamaica, Jordan, Japan, 
Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, 
Morocco, Mexico, Malta, 
Myanmar, Mauritius, Malaysia, 
Nicaragua, Netherlands, Oman, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Poland, 
North Korea, Portugal, 
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Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Philippines, 
Poland, North Korea, 
Portugal, Romania, 
Sudan, Senegal, 
Singapore, El Salvador, 
Slovak Republic, 
Sweden, Syria,  
Togo, Thailand, 
Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United 
States, Vietnam, Yemen, 
South Africa 
Tunisia, Turkey, United States, 
Yemen, South Africa, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Georgia, Croatia, 
Kazakhstan, Cambodia, 
Lithuania, Moldova, 
Macedonia, Mongolia, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
Romania, Sudan, Senegal, 
Singapore, El Salvador, Slovak 
Republic, Sweden, Syria, Togo, 
Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United States, 
Yemen, South Africa, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Eritrea, 
Estonia, Croatia, Kazakhstan, 
Cambodia, Lithuania, Moldova, 
Macedonia, Mongolia, Russia, 
Serbia, Slovenia, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Niger, 
Suriname, Kosovo 
Source: Compiled by the authors.  
 
Second, we conducted a linear regression analysis per hypothesis and timeframe with 
hydropower production rate per country as an independent variable. This analysis gives an idea of 
whether hydropower production is correlated with the selected metrics over all countries, how this 
correlation is pronounced (positively or negatively), and how much variance hydropower can explain in 
the six dependent variables. 
In sum, our research design allowed us to conduct six tests per hypothesis: the difference in the 
research variable between hydropower producing countries and non-hydropower countries in the three 
timeframes 1985-1994, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014, and the effect of the hydropower production rate on 
the research variables in the three timeframes 1985-1994, 1995-2004 and 2005-2014. For control of 
corruption, only four hypotheses could be tested, since there was no data available for timeframe 1. In 
accordance with Field (2009: 57), we treat r = .1 (R2 = .01) as the threshold for a small effect or 
association/correlation, r = .3 (R2 = .09) as the threshold for a medium effect or association/correlation, 
and r = .5 (R2 = .25) as the threshold for a large effect or association/correlation. The significance level 
for all tests was set to p < .05 (2-sided).  
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3.3 Limitations  
Admittedly, our research design has some drawbacks. Many of the security, poverty, 
development, and governance issues we examine occur at local levels, yet our analysis focuses entirely 
at the level of the nation state. There are two reasons for this decision: First, data for most countries 
was available only on a national basis, and second, we wanted our study to move beyond the kind of 
isolated local case studies that so dominate the literature we reviewed. Moreover, we maintain that for 
our hypotheses to be true among a variety of major hydropower states (those relying on dams to 
generate at least 70 percent of their electricity), such infrastructure would have to be spread across 
large enough parts of each state to have a meaningful effect on national trends and statistics.  In 
addition, our analysis may not capture the harms inflicted on downstream countries affected by, but not 
benefiting from, the upstream country building the dam: e.g. the entire eastern Mediterranean has been 
affected by Egypt’s High Aswan Dam, or the damage from upstream Chinese dams on downstream 
communities in the Mekong region. 
 Furthermore, our analysis allows for only correlative interpretations regarding the relationship 
between hydropower production and governance, economic development, and environmental metrics. 
This is primarily because we did not include other factors that might affect these relationships, such as 
specific characteristics of political systems, national and local regulations, different domestic energy 
needs and energy portfolios, and other development indicators such as literacy or public health. Herein 
lies a problem common to the use of data sets of quantified or dichotomized variables: George and 
Bennett (2005: 44) note that they can ‘achieve reproducible results across many cases (external 
validity) but only at the cost of losing some of the ability to devise measures that faithfully represent 
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the variables that they are designed to capture (internal validity).’ Last, our analysis focuses on 
hydropower electricity production and not construction rates, meaning that the effects of operating 
dams on the dependent variables are displayed, not the effect of constructing dams. An analysis which 
includes hydropower construction rates and their effect on governance and economic metrics can be 
found in Sovacool & Walter (2018). However, that  analysis ended with 2010 data, looked at difference 
reference classes of countries, and did not examine all of the hypotheses investigated here.   
4. Results and Discussion   
 This section of the paper presents the results of the empirical analyses we conducted in relation 
to each of our six hypotheses, namely examining whether (1) hydropower increases internal conflict, 
(2) hydropower increases poverty, (3) hydropower decreases economic growth rates, (4) hydropower 
increases rates of public debt, (5) hydropower increases corruption, and (6) hydropower increases 
greenhouse emissions.  
 As this section will demonstrate, our analysis of key country metrics from 1985 to 2014 
produces mixed results with regards to the hypotheses. Table 7 gives an overview of the results per 
hypotheses, Table 8 the results of the regression analyses. While results are only included if they reach 
significance, it is interesting to note that the trend (direction) of all conducted tests in the three 
timeframes for hypotheses 1-5 is always in line with what our hypotheses would suggest, with 
exception of only two cases (namely the difference in internal conflicts (timeframe 1) and external debt 
stock (timeframe 3) between hydropower countries and non-hydropower countries).    
Table 7: Summary of hypotheses tests 
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Dimension Hypothesis Results 
Wilcoxon  
rank-sum test 
Regression analysis 
Internal 
Conflict 
Hydropower increases conflict.  Not supported Not supported 
Poverty Hydropower increases poverty.  Partially supported  (timeframe 2 and 3) 
Partially supported  
(timeframe 2 and 3) 
Development Hydropower decreases economic growth rates.  Supported  (all timeframes) 
Partially supported  
(timeframe 2 and 3) 
Fiscal 
responsibility  
Hydropower increases rates of public debt.  Partially supported  
(timeframe 2) 
Partially supported  
(timeframe 2) 
Governance  Hydropower increases corruption.  Partially supported  (timeframe 2) 
Partially supported  
(timeframe 2) 
Environmental 
degradation  
Hydropower increases greenhouse gas 
emissions. Not supported Not supported  
Source: Authors.  
 
Table 8: Summary of conducted regression analyses 
Dependent Variables  Timeframe 1 
1985-1994 
Timeframe 2 
1995-2004 
Timeframe 3 
2005-2014 
Number of conflicts β .08 .07 .02 
 R2 .01 .01 .00 
 N 113 136 140 
Poverty Gap β .21 .37*** .38*** 
 R2 .04 .14 .14 
 N 54 99 115 
GDP per capita β -.18 -.21* -.18* 
 R2 .03 .04 .03 
 N 105 132 136 
External debt stocks β .11 .39*** .04 
 R2 .01 .15 .00 
 N 60 81 83 
Control of Corruption β - -.24** -.16 
 R2 - .06 .03 
 N - 134 140 
Greenhouse gas  
emissions per capita 
β -.05 -.19* -.19* 
R2 .00 .04 .04 
N 109 134 136 
Independent variable: hydropower electricity production in previous year to 
timeframe; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001; significant results in bold; Source: 
Authors  
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We can tentatively summarize our results as follows: Hypotheses 1 and 6 are not supported by 
the data analysis. It seems that hydropower electricity production does not increase the number of 
internal conflicts a country experiences, and actually reduces greenhouse gas emissions per capita. All 
other hypotheses find partial support in the data: It seems that hydropower increases to some extent 
poverty, GDP per capita, public debt and corruption. Regarding hypotheses 2 to 5, 13 out of 22 (59.1%) 
conducted tests yielded significant results in line with our hypotheses.  It is especially noteworthy that 
we found that hydropower influences a country’s governance, economic and development indicators 
significantly—even though it plays such a small part of the respective countries’ economies. In the 
following section, a detailed description of the results per hypotheses is given. Figure 2 summarizes our 
findings in the form of boxplots.   
Figure 2: Boxplots of the six dependent variables in three country classes and three timeframes (per variable are 
displayed: minimum, maximum, 25%-Percentile, 75%-Percentile and the median; maxima are not fully displayed) 
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Source: Authors. Note: Due to data availability, control of corruption covers only the periods 1995 to 2004 and 2005-2014; 
data for greenhouse gas emissions in timeframe 3 only goes to 2012. 
4.1 Hydropower and conflict 
Our results, redrawn from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset, do not support this 
hypothesis: While hydropower countries experienced more internal conflicts by trend than non-
hydropower countries in timeframe 2 and 3 (see figure 2 above), none of these differences reaches 
significance (all p > .05). A similar picture emerges when applying regression analyses to the dataset 
(see table 8): While the hydropower production rate positively influences the number of experienced 
internal conflicts in all three timeframes, standardized coefficients and effect sizes are very small, and 
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none of the effects reaches significance.  When comparing hydropower countries to OPEC countries, it 
becomes clear that, while OPEC countries experienced more internal conflicts than hydropower 
countries in all three timeframes, once more none of these differences reaches significance (all p > 
.05).  
4.2 Hydropower and poverty 
Our empirical results partially support the hypothesis linking hydropower and poverty rates. 
While all effects were in line with the hypothesis by trend, only four out of six tests conducted showed 
significant results. As figure 2 reveals, hydropower countries have a higher poverty gap than non-
hydropower countries in all timeframes. However, only the differences in timeframe 2 (Ws = 2 725.5, z 
= -4.01, p < .001, r = -.41) and timeframe 3 (Ws = 4 425.5, z = -3.66, p < .001, r = -.35) reach 
significance, yielding both medium effects. The application of regression analysis to the dataset lends 
further support to our finding (see Table 8 above). Hydropower production rates seem to have a 
pronounced positive effect on the poverty gap by trend. In timeframe 2 and 3, the effects become 
significant (p < .001), and yield medium effect sizes. As an additional finding, hydropower countries 
do also have a higher poverty gap than OPEC countries in all three timeframes; however, none of these 
differences reaches significance (p > .05).  
4.3 Hydropower and economic growth  
Our empirical findings partially support this hypothesis. From six conducted tests, five yielded 
significant results in line with our hypothesis, the last one only by trend. In all three analyzed 
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timeframes, hydropower countries do have a lower GDP per capita than non-hydropower countries (see 
figure 2). All three differences reached significance and amounted to small-sized effects (timeframe 1: 
Ws = 936, z = -2.38, p < .05, r = -.24; timeframe 2: Ws = 1482, z = -3.22, p < .01, r = -.29; timeframe 
3: Ws = 1070, z = -2.52, p < .05, r = -.22). With regards to the regression analysis, hydropower 
production rates had a negative effect on GDP per capita by trend in all three timeframes, however only 
the effects in the last two timeframes reached significance and yielded small effects (see Table 8). As 
an additional finding, hydropower countries did have a smaller GDP per capita than OPEC countries in 
all three timeframes; however, only the differences in timeframe 2 (Ws = 641, z = -2.44, p < .05, r = -
.37) and timeframe 3 (Ws = 327, z = -2.20, p < .05, r = -0.39) reached significance and yielded medium 
effects.  
4.4 Hydropower and debt  
 Our empirical findings only partially support this hypothesis: From six conducted tests, only 
two reached significant results in line with our hypothesis, and three further tests supported the 
hypothesis at least by trend. As can be seen in figure 2, hydropower countries do have a higher external 
debt stock than non-hydropower countries in timeframe 1 and 2, while for timeframe 3 the opposite is 
true. However, only the difference in timeframe 2 reached significance (Ws = 1797, z = -2.28, p < .05, r 
= -0.26) and yielded a small effect. Table 8, which is based on our regression analyses, adds some 
nuance to this finding: While the effect of the hydropower production rate on external debt stocks is in 
line with our hypothesis by trend in all three timeframes, only the effect in timeframe 2 reaches 
significance and amounts to a medium-sized effect. In addition, figure 3 shows that hydropower 
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countries have higher external debt stocks than OPEC countries in all three timeframes. The difference 
in timeframe 3 even reached significance (Ws = 6, z = -2.73, p < .01, r = -0.58) and amounts to a large 
effect.    
 One possible explanation for why this hypothesis was only partially supported is that even 
though hydropower projects generate debt and suffer from overruns, in the long-run they pay off, in 
most cases, and show positive economic gains. Hydroelectricity supports lighting, communication, 
transport, commerce, manufacturing, industry, and agricultural productivity, though as the hypothesis 
about GDP shows, growth may be comparatively slower in hydropower countries than in non-hydro 
countries. Still, the IPCC have indicated that large hydropower projects can bring salient ‘multiplier 
effects’ of forty cents to a dollar for every dollar invested beyond the cost of the dam (Kumar et al. 
2011). Yang (2003) has also calculated that in China every yuan invested into hydropower projects 
brings 5.13 yuan in generated GDP. Electricity makes so many things possible that some have even 
viewed its provision as a fundamental human right (Bradbook and Gardam 2006).  
 A second possible explanation is that hydropower dams seem costly in an absolute sense but are 
still better than some alternatives, notably nuclear power or fossil-fuels. Levent (2010) noted, for 
example, that in the absolute sense the construction of dams has had negative consequences for Turkey, 
but they were comparatively less polluting—and ultimately better for the economy—than the coal-fired 
power plants that could have been built. Moreover, not all of the countries in our major hydropower 
country class relied exclusively on large-scale, capital intensive dams—some, such as Nepal (Gippner 
et al. 2013), Tanzania (Adebayo et al. 2013) and Sri Lanka (Sovacool 2013), utilize smaller-scale, run-
of-river designs that can operate without reservoirs. Multiplied in aggregate, such small and micro-
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hydro units can achieve all the generation capacity of large scale units, minimize opportunities for 
corruption, and when designed properly and well governed address environmental problems and 
increase developmental outcomes (Paish 2002).  
4.5 Hydropower and corruption  
Our data does partially support the hypothesis about a connection between hydropower and 
corruption. From four conducted tests, two yielded significant results in line with our hypothesis, the 
other two only by trend. Hydropower countries do have a lower value in the control of corruption index 
than non-hydropower countries in both timeframe 2 and timeframe 3 (timeframe 1 was not included in 
the analysis because the control of corruption index only started in 1996; see also figure 2). The 
difference in timeframe 2 reaches significance (Ws = 1520.5, z = -2.47, p < .05, r = -0.22) and amounts 
to a small effect. The same picture emerges in the regression analyses (see table 7): In both timeframes, 
the hydropower production rate has a negative effect on control of corruption, while only the difference 
in timeframe 2 reaches significance and yields a small effect size. An additional finding was that 
hydropower countries do score higher on the control of corruption index than OPEC countries in both 
timeframes, however none of the differences reaches significance.   
 
4.6 Hydropower and environmental degradation   
 Our data does not support this hypothesis. As can be seen in Figure 2, hydropower countries do 
actually have lower greenhouse gas emissions per capita than non-hydropower countries in all three 
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timeframes. However, all of these three differences fail to reach significance. The conducted regression 
analyses (see Table 8) yield similar findings: hydropower production rate had a negative effect on 
greenhouse gas emissions in all three timeframes, however only the effects in timeframe 2 and 3 
reached significance and amounted to small effect sizes. The comparison of hydropower countries with 
OPEC countries yields a further, though not surprising nuance to these findings: As can be seen in 
Figure 2, in all three timeframes, hydropower countries do have lower greenhouse gas emissions than 
OPEC countries, however only the difference in timeframe 2 reaches significance and amounted to a 
medium effect size (Ws = 653, z = -2.01, p < .05, r = -.32).   
 Here, as with our hydropower and (financial) debt hypothesis, the carbon debt of a dam exists 
but is (slowly) paid off as the dam operates and/or displaces more carbon intensive forms of electricity 
supply.  In a separate study looking at the energy payback ratio of different electricity systems, Gagnon 
(2008) estimated the ratio of total energy produced compared to the energy needed to build and operate 
an energy system. As Table 9 shows, he found that hydroelectric plants performed the best out of any 
source of electricity (save energy efficiency, which was not examined).  So most dams pay back their 
energy (and carbon) debts quickly and for many years after.  Nugent et al. (2014) also note that 
hydropower’s lifecycle carbon footprint was the lowest among all sources of supply, even more 
competitive than low-carbon biomass, solar, and wind power.  Then we have a list of other positive 
environmental attributes that can help offset the negative ones framing hypothesis 2.6: that dams can 
provide baseload power and thus displace coal or nuclear plants, that dams  (with reservoirs) can also 
ramp up and down to meet flexible loads, that dams can balance and optimize intermittent renewable 
sources of energy and help integrate them into the grid, that dams have a long-lived life span (100 years 
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or more) and comparatively low maintenance and operating costs, and that they produce no 
atmospheric pollutants and do not contribute to ambient air pollution. (International Hydroelectric 
Association 2003).  
Table 9: Lifecycle energy payback ratios for various sources of electricity supply 
Source Low estimate High estimate 
Hydropower with reservoir 205 280 
Run of river hydropower 170 267 
Onshore wind power, 35% use factor 18  34  
Biomass wastes - 27 
Biomass plantation 3 (hauled 100 km) 5 (hauled 20 km) 
Solar photovoltaic 3 6 
Nuclear, conventional Pressurized Water Reactor  14 16 
Natural gas, combined-cycle turbine; 55% efficiency 
 
2.5 (transported 
4000 km) 
 
 
5 (near gas well) 
 
 
Fuel cell, natural gas 1.5 3 
Oil, conventional boiler; 35% efficiency 0.7 (Tar sands) 2.9 (conventional oil 
Coal, conventional boiler; 35% efficiency; modern 
SO2 scrubbing 
2.5 (transported 
2000 km) 
5.1 (transported 500 km) 
Coal, conventional boiler; with CO2 capture and 
sequestration  
1.6 (transported 
2000 km) 
3.3 (transported 500 km) 
Source: Modified from Gagnon (2008) 
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5. Conclusion and Implications 
 To conclude, our statistical tests of six hydropower hypotheses gives varying results. While our 
data does not support the hypotheses that hydropower increases the number of internal conflicts a 
country experiences or an increase in greenhouse gas emissions per capita, the other four hypotheses 
find at least partial support in the data.  In terms of poverty, from 1995-2004 and from 2005-2014, 
major hydropower states increased significantly their poverty gap and reduced significantly their GDP 
per capita. In addition, from 1995-2004 major hydropower states significantly increased external debt 
stocks and reduced significantly control of corruption. It is worthy to note that only for timeframe 1, 
which has the most missing data by far, no significant effects whatsoever in line with our hypotheses 
were found.  In sum, when looking at the significant effects only, the hydropower production rate per 
country was able to explain between 4% and 15% of the variance of the four dependent variables 
poverty gap, GDP per capita, external debt stocks and control of corruption, which at country-level is 
surprising indeed. With these results in mind, we advance four separate conclusions. 
 First, the possible benefits of hydroelectricity—improved energy access, economic 
development, positive spillover effects, reduced carbon emissions—are real, but all too frequently, they 
are constrained. Although dams ostensibly are championed for their economies of scale and ability to 
bring about industrialization, our comparative assessment of different reference classes of countries 
suggest that major investments in hydropower do not result in gains greater than those made by OPEC 
and non-hydro countries. This finding potentially undermines the belief that supplying electricity via 
hydroelectric dams ought to be viewed primarily as a means to achieving economic development (or at 
least, GDP growth). Indeed, our study challenges the model that the GDP growth and per capita energy 
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consumption offered from hydropower must go hand in hand and that the trickle-down benefits from 
industrialization and rapid economic growth will inevitably bring national competitive advantage.  
 Second, however, our analysis provides only partial support to our hypotheses, and thus 
suggests that hydroelectricity may not be necessarily as damaging as other sources of energy, notably 
fossil fuels. It may be that many of the single case studies from which we derived our hypotheses look 
at the very real consequences of dams in an absolute sense, detailing the incidence of their cost 
overruns or the severity and impacts of the increased poverty they impose on a population. These 
shortcomings of dams, though real, may pale in comparison to the deleterious effects of other policies, 
programs, and investments. Countries and their planners may simultaneously be erecting many other 
types of infrastructure and embarking on scores of other industrial projects. These other projects may 
degrade and marginalize people to a greater degree than hydropower dams, considering that countries 
that pursue hydroelectricity (compared to, say, nuclear power or coal) generally perform better on 
selected indicators, especially carbon footprints and energy payback ratios, than those that do not. And 
in some cases benefits of hydroelectric dams outweigh their costs, though these benefits may occur in 
urban areas far removed from the dam itself. Considerations of scale, scope, and temporality must be 
considered: Hydropower compared to what, and at what geographic scale?  Major hydropower states 
compared to what types of countries?  And, in what timeframe will costs and benefits unfold?  Change 
either of these assumptions and you may alter the perception of hydropower. Hence the value of a 
cross-national and comparative approach is that it moves beyond single cases or isolated dam projects 
to focus on international dimensions.  
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 Third, our data suggest that current calls for substantial, global investment in hydropower 
installed capacity and generation, including those from major institutions such as the International 
Energy Agency, IRENA, IPCC, and World Bank, must be closely scrutinized. The World Bank’s 
particular support in recent years for large-scale hydropower as an aid in international development 
may be founded on mistaken assumptions regarding the long-range costs of given projects. Projects 
like the Bank-supported Grand Inga Dam in the Democratic Republic of Congo are all planned on a 
transformational scale, and designed in part for their speedy and far-reaching economic impact (Green 
et al. 2015). Our data suggest that energy and sustainable development programs must better recognize 
the complexity of possible tradeoffs when investing in hydropower and better recognize, and perhaps 
compensate, potential losers.   
This brings us to our fourth and final conclusion: hydropower will likely remain a contested 
energy option for years to come, given the pronounced tradeoffs intrinsic to its adoption.  Planners, 
investors, and analysts may need to rethink their underlying assumptions about how they evaluate 
hydropower’s risks, advantages and feasibility in particular locations, including size, management, 
costs, and benefits, social and environmental impacts among them. Admittedly, local factors are 
important.  For example, some projects may place their reservoirs in high mountain areas or remote 
deserts with no local populations to relocate and minimal impacts on the environment. Others, in low-
lying riverbanks, may cause substantial risks to fisheries, flooding, and food security. Still others in 
may involve the inundation of highly valued land and the involuntary resettlement of thousands, or 
even millions, of people. As Koch (2002: 1209) surmises, many of these considerations are unique to 
hydropower, and they mean that ‘the weighing of benefits against costs becomes difficult and often 
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controversial, and high levels of social, environmental, technical, and political skills are required to 
plan, construct, and operate the project’.  
However, such local factors also need contextualized at the national (and even international) 
scale.   The answers to questions of whether ‘hydropower is good for security’ or ‘development or any 
other benefit’ are never predetermined, and require greater analysis from an IPE lens. We need to 
consider not only the magnitude of costs and benefits, but the equitable nature and timing of their 
distribution, and how they may flow within, between and beyond states.  While our results suggest that 
hydropower dams do help in decarbonizing national economies, at least insofar as per capita carbon 
dioxide emissions fall, such a low-carbon pathway comes at a cost in terms of economic and 
sociopolitical tradeoffs.  In sum: the political economy of hydroelectricity is also about national choices 
that are being made between which forms of (low carbon) electricity to invest in, and why.  Which 
nations build dams, who benefits from them, and who suffers their costs—who wins and loses—must 
remain a central part of examining the promise—and peril—of hydropower.  
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